When the shootings are viewed, as they must be, in light of all the surrounding circumstances and what Wilson knew at the time, as established by the credible physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, it was not unreasonable for Wilson to fire on Brown until he stopped moving forward and was clearly subdued. Although, with hindsight, we know that Brown was not armed with a gun or other weapon, this fact does not render Wilson’s use of deadly force objectively unreasonable. Again, the key question is whether Brown could reasonably have been perceived to pose a deadly threat to Wilson at the time he shot him regardless of whether Brown was armed. Sufficient credible evidence supports Wilson’s claim that he reasonably perceived Brown to be posing a deadly threat. First, Wilson did not know that Brown was not armed at the time he shot him, and had reason to suspect that he might be when Brown reached into the waistband of his pants as he advanced toward Wilson. See Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 966 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that “[e]ven if a suspect is ultimately ‘found to be unarmed, a police officer can still employ deadly force if objectively reasonable.’”) (quoting Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2002)); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Also irrelevant is the fact that [the suspect] was actually unarmed. [The officer] did not and could not have known this.”); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (noting that “unarmed” does not mean “harmless) (6th Cir. 1992). While Brown did not use a gun on Wilson at the SUV, his aggressive actions would have given Wilson reason to at least question whether he might be armed, as would his subsequent forward advance and reach toward his waistband. This is especially so in light of the rapidly­evolving nature of the incident. Wilson did not have time to determine whether Brown had a gun and was not required to risk being shot himself in order to make a more definitive assessment. Moreover, Wilson could present evidence that a jury likely would credit that he reasonably perceived a deadly threat from Brown even if Brown’s hands were empty and he had never reached into his waistband because of Brown’s actions in refusing to halt his forward movement toward Wilson. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Loch v. City of Litchfield is dispositive on this point. There, an officer shot a suspect eight times as he advanced toward the officer. Although the suspect’s “arms were raised above his head or extended at his sides,” the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable officer could have perceived the suspect’s forward advance in the face of the officer’s commands to stop as resistance and a threat. As the Court of Appeals explained: Although [the suspect] had by this time thrown his firearm in the snow, … [the officer] did not observe that action. Instead of complying with [the officer’s] command to get on the ground, [the suspect] turned and moved toward the officer. [Plaintiffs], noting that [the suspect’s] arms were raised above his head or extended at his sides, suggest that [the suspect] was simply trying to find a suitable place to get on the ground, because his truck sat near a tree and snowbank. But even if [the suspect’s] motives were innocent, a reasonable officer on the scene could have interpreted [the suspect’s] actions as resistance. It is undisputed that [the suspect] continued toward [the officer] despite the officer's repeated orders to get on the ground …. Thus, a reasonable officer could believe that [the suspect’s] failure to comply was a matter of choice rather than necessity. Loch, 689 F.3d 961, 966 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 84