tion; livelihoods highly dependent on natural resources or agriculture; weak or illegitimate con昀氀ict resolution mechanisms; a history of ENERGY TRANSITION GEOPOLITICS violence; and low adaptive capacity. For exam- AND ECONOMICS ple, an increase in drought or extreme weath- er may reduce the opportunity cost of joining The transition from fossil fuels has the potential to signifi- armed groups for struggling farmers and herd- cantly reshape geopolitics and economics, depending on ers, while sectarian elites may advance their its speed and structure. Petro-states—currently accounting polarizing political goals by exploiting local for 8 percent of world GDP and nearly 900 million citi- grievances exacerbated by climate change. zens—would face major revenue losses in an aggressively Strain Military Readiness. While militaries decarbonizing scenario. Those that can more efficiently and will continue to adapt and 昀椀ght in the chang- cheaply extract oil or diversify their economies will better ing world, climate e昀昀ects will strain readiness weather the transition. and compound 昀椀scal pressures on many In addition, the transition will diminish countries’ ability militaries. Storm surges and sea level rise will to use energy as a tool of coercion or statecraft because force changes to the design and protection of naval bases and aircraft runways, prolonged energy systems will become more decentralized. Countries extreme heat will limit training days, and will have decreased leverage in energy markets because oil and renewables operate differently; the former is an major storms and 昀氀oods will force militaries to divert more resources to disaster relief at extracted resource that is traded, whereas the latter is home and abroad. harnessed by building out domestic infrastructure. As a Increase Pressure on Strained International result, it will be more difficult for any one country to affect Systems. Current international law and coop- others’ energy supply. For example, Chinese dominance of erative bodies are increasingly mismatched the clean energy equipment market does not allow Beijing to global climate challenges. For example, to threaten global energy supplies in the way that control of international refugee law does not account for the oil markets by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries once did. people displaced by climate change e昀昀ects. Many existing organizations designed to help However, a shift to renewable energy will increase compe- manage shared resources, such as the Arctic tition over certain minerals, particularly cobalt and lithium Council or the Nile Basin Initiative, may be for batteries and rare earths for magnets in electric motors overwhelmed or sidelined, given their volun- and generators. As actors race to develop new renewable tary nature and lack of enforcement mecha- energy technology during the next two decades, they will nisms. Also, e昀昀orts to develop international focus on countries that supply these minerals, such as the standards or regulations for high-risk activities Democratic Republic of the Congo and Bolivia. like SRM lag behind the technology, increasing the possibility that countries or individuals will pursue unilateral action that risk blowback. Photo / Bigstock A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 41

GlobalTrends 2040 - Page 49 GlobalTrends 2040 Page 48 Page 50