China will work to solidify its own physical environmental pressures, and rising labor infrastructure networks, software platforms, costs could challenge the Chinese Communist and trade rules, sharpening the global lines of Party and undercut its ability to achieve its techno-economic competition and potentially goals. China’s aggressive diplomacy and hu- creating more balkanized systems in some man rights violations, including suppression of regions. China is likely to use its infrastructure Muslim and Christian communities, could limit and technology-led development programs its in昀氀uence, particularly its soft power. to tie countries closer and ensure elites align with its interests. China probably will continue Other Major Powers to seek to strengthen economic integration Other major powers, including Russia, the EU, with partners in the Middle East and Indian Japan, the United Kingdom, and potentially In- Ocean region, expand its economic penetra- dia, could have more maneuvering room to ex- tion in Central Asia and the Arctic, and work ercise in昀氀uence during the next two decades, to prevent countervailing coalitions from and they are likely to be consequential in emerging. China is looking to expand exports shaping geopolitical and economic outcomes of sophisticated domestic surveillance tech- as well as evolving norms and rules. nologies to shore up friendly governments Russia is likely to remain a disruptive power and create commercial and data-generating for much or all of the next two decades even opportunities as well as leverage with client as its material capabilities decline relative regimes. China is likely to use its technological to other major players. Russia’s advantages, advancements to 昀椀eld a formidable military including a sizeable conventional military, in East Asia and other regions but prefers weapons of mass destruction, energy and min- tailored deployments—mostly in the form of eral resources, an expansive geography, and a naval bases—rather than large troop deploy- willingness to use force overseas, will enable ments. At the same time, Beijing probably will it to continue playing the role of spoiler and seek to retain some important linkages to US power broker in the post-Soviet space, and at and Western-led networks, especially in areas times farther a昀椀eld. Moscow most likely will of greater interdependence such as 昀椀nance continue trying to amplify divisions in the West and manufacturing. and to build relationships in Africa, across the China is likely to play a greater role in leading Middle East, and elsewhere. Russia probably responses to confronting global challenges will look for economic opportunity and to es- commensurate with its increasing power and tablish a dominant military position in the Arc- tic as more countries step up their presence in in昀氀uence, but Beijing will also expect to have the region. However, with a poor investment a greater say in prioritizing and shaping those climate, high reliance on commodities with responses in line with its interests. China potentially volatile prices, and a small econo- probably will look to other countries to o昀昀set the costs of tackling transnational challenges my—projected to be approximately 2 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) for in part because Beijing faces growing domestic the next two decades—Russia may struggle to problems that will compete for attention and project and maintain in昀氀uence globally. Pres- resources. Potential 昀椀nancial crises, a rapidly ident Vladimir Putin’s departure from power, aging workforce, slowing productivity growth, either at the end of his current term in 2024 A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 95 Photos / Bigstock