over decades and probably will be di昀케cult to power and in昀氀uence abroad. Building resilien- recon昀椀gure. If China’s technology companies cy, however, depends on a reservoir of trust become co-dominant with US or European within societies and between populations and counterparts in some regions or dominate leaders, and is likely to be more di昀케cult to global 5G telecommunications networks, for muster as societies become more fractured. example, Beijing could exploit its privileged position to access communications or con- MORE ACTORS ASSERTING AGENCY trol data 昀氀ows. Exercising this form of power As sources of power expand and shift globally, coercively, however, risks triggering a backlash the actors and the roles they play in shaping from other countries, and could diminish the global dynamics will also change. No single e昀昀ectiveness over time. actor will be positioned to dominate across all Information and In昀氀uence. Compelling ideas regions and in all domains, o昀昀ering opportuni- and narratives can shape the attitudes and ties for a broader array of actors and increas- priorities of other actors in the international ing competition across all issues. The growing system, and they can legitimize the exercise of contest between China and the United States other types of power. The soft power attrac- and its close allies is likely to have the broad- tiveness of a society, including its culture, est and deepest impact on global dynamics, in- entertainment exports, sports, lifestyles, and cluding global trade and information 昀氀ows, the technology innovations, can also capture the pace and direction of technological change, imagination of other populations. Tourism and the likelihood and outcome of interstate con- education abroad—particularly higher educa- 昀氀icts, and environmental sustainability. Even tion—can increase the attractiveness. From under the most modest estimates, Beijing is public diplomacy and media to more covert poised to continue to make military, economic, in昀氀uence operations, information technolo- and technological advancements that shift the gies will give governments and other actors geopolitical balance, particularly in Asia. unprecedented abilities to reach directly to China Reclaiming Global Power Role foreign publics and elites to in昀氀uence opinions In the next two decades, China almost certain- and policies. China and Russia probably will try ly will look to assert dominance in Asia and to continue targeting domestic audiences in greater in昀氀uence globally, while trying to avoid the United States and Europe, promoting nar- what it views as excessive liabilities in strategi- ratives about Western decline and overreach. cally marginal regions. In Asia, China expects They also are likely to expand in other regions, deference from neighbors on trade, resource for example Africa, where both have already exploitation, and territorial disputes. China is been active. likely to 昀椀eld military capabilities that put US Resiliency. As the world has become more and allied forces in the region at heightened deeply interconnected, systemic shocks are risk and to press US allies and partners to becoming more common and more intense, restrict US basing access. Beijing probably will spawning many second-order e昀昀ects. Govern- tout the bene昀椀ts of engagement while warning ments that are able to withstand, manage, and of severe consequences of de昀椀ance. China’s recover from shocks and that have domestic leaders almost certainly expect Taiwan to move closer to reuni昀椀cation by 2040, possibly legitimacy will have better capacity to project through sustained and intensive coercion. 94 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 Photos / Bigstock