hese power dynamics are Tlikely to produce a more volatile and confrontational and international organizations that have un- geopolitical environment, reshape derpinned the international order for decades. Accelerating power shifts—as well as hard- multilateralism, and widen the gap ening ideological di昀昀erences and divisions over governance models—are likely to further between transnational challenges ratchet up competition. The rivalry is unlikely to resemble the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold and cooperative arrangements to War, however, because of the greater variety of actors in the international system that can address them. shape outcomes, interdependence in various domains, and fewer exclusive ideological divid- ing lines. The lack of a preponderant power During the next two decades, the intensity or global consensus on some key areas will of competition for global in昀氀uence is likely o昀昀er opportunities for other actors to lead or to reach its highest level since the Cold War. pursue their own interests, especially within No single state is likely to be positioned to their regions. The European Union (EU), India, dominate across all regions or domains, and Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom most a broader range of actors will compete to likely will also be consequential in shaping advance their ideologies, goals, and inter- geopolitical and economic outcomes. ests. Expanding technological, network, and This more competitive environment with information power will complement more rapidly emerging technologies is likely to be traditional military, economic, and soft power aspects in the international system. These more volatile with a heightened risk of con昀氀ict, power elements, which will be more accessi- at least until states establish new rules, norms, ble to a broader range of actors, are likely to and boundaries for the more disruptive areas be concentrated among leaders that develop of competition. States will face a combination these technologies. of highly destructive and precise conventional and strategic weapons, cyber activity targeting These power dynamics are likely to produce a civilian and military infrastructure, and a con- more volatile and confrontational geopolitical fusing disinformation environment. Regional environment, reshape multilateralism, and actors, including spoilers such as Iran and widen the gap between transnational chal- North Korea, will jockey to advance their goals lenges and cooperative arrangements to ad- and interests, bringing more volatility and dress them. Rival powers will jockey to shape uncertainty to the system. At the same time, global norms, rules, and institutions. The Unit- states may struggle to establish stable deter- ed States, along with its longstanding allies, rence with these new systems, particularly if and China will have the greatest in昀氀uence on the rules and treaties governing them contin- global dynamics, supporting competing visions ue to erode or lag. of the international system and governance that re昀氀ect their core interests and ideologies. CHANGING SOURCES AND Their rivalry will a昀昀ect most domains, straining COMPOSITION OF POWER and in some cases reshaping existing alliances During the next 20 years, sources of power in the international system are likely to expand 92 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040