have given populations the tools to circum- and growing pains within states, as exempli- vent digital repression and mobilize dissent. 昀椀ed by illiberal regimes cracking down on civil In addition to repression, regimes will rely on society organizations or democracies seeking cooptation to convince critical allies to stay to regulate social media and operations of loyal, but this dynamic depends on more ten- some nonstate actors. uous 昀氀ows of resources. Many authoritarian Depending on the context and activity, non- governments will seek to build popular legit- state actors will complement, compete with, imacy through e昀昀ective government perfor- and in some cases replace the state. The mance and compelling ideologies. With their provision of governance outside state insti- centralized power, some authoritarian regimes tutions does not necessarily pose a threat to have demonstrated faster and more 昀氀exible central governments, nor does it diminish the responses to emerging challenges, but histori- overall quality of governance for the popu- cally authoritarian governments have su昀昀ered lation. The roles and relationships between from lack of innovation caused by misalloca- state and nonstate actors will depend on their tion of resources. Authoritarian regimes that relative capacity, penetration, and alignment deliver economic opportunities and maintain with population expectations. From the Middle security may convince their publics that their East to Africa and Latin America, insurgent system is better suited to dealing with the complexity and speed of tomorrow’s world. groups and criminal organizations are 昀椀lling in the governance gap and at times exploiting ADAPTIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE: MORE weak governments to expand their in昀氀uence ACTORS PROVIDING A WIDER RANGE OF SERVICES by providing employment and social services, As public needs and expectations mount, ranging from healthcare and education to there is likely to be a growing shift toward security and trash collection. In other cases adaptive approaches to governance that particularly in Africa, international NGOs, involve a broader set of actors outside state some religiously based, augment the role of institutions delivering welfare and security. the state by providing health and education Nonstate actors, including private sector com- services. During the COVID-19 pandemic, panies, NGOs, civil society groups, religious numerous examples of adaptive governance organizations, and insurgent and criminal have appeared. Corporations, philanthropies, networks, have long provided governance in technology companies, and research and all types of states. These roles are likely to ex- academic institutions have worked in concert pand to a wider range of actors and functions with governments to produce breakthroughs because of a combination of factors including: at record speeds. Elsewhere, civil society or- the failure of states to provide adequate gov- ganizations all over the world have 昀椀lled gaps ernance; the increasing resources and reach in government responses, providing humani- of the private sector, NGOs, and individuals tarian relief and welfare services. This role of because of technology; and the growing com- nonstate actors in governance extends beyond plexity and number of public policy challenges providing services; for example, technology that require multiple stakeholders to address. companies wield signi昀椀cant power in their This shift is likely to produce some tensions control over information 昀氀ows and networks with the ability to shape political discourse. 86 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040