FIGURE 2.6 Pre-2022 trends in militarization and conflict Nuclear and heavy weapons Deaths from external conflict Terrorism impact Military expernditure (% GDP) Incarceration rate Perception of criminality Weapons import Armed services personnel rate Violent demonstrations Police rate Homicide rate Internal conflicts fought External conflicts fought UN Peacekeeping funding Access to small arms Violent crime Political instability Refugees and IDPs Intensity of internal conflicts Neighbouring countries relations Intensity of internal conflicts Political terror scale Deaths from internal conflicts -6 -4 -2 0 +2 +4 +6 % Change in average score Source Note I EP, 2022. Percentage change in global score by indicator, 2021-2022. A reversal of the trend towards demilitarization will GDP, which, if met by all members, would represent 53 heighten the risk of con昀氀ict, on a potentially more an increase in total budget by 7% in real terms. destructive scale. Growing mistrust and suspicion Widespread defence spending, particularly on between global and regional powers has already research and development, could deepen insecurity led to the reprioritization of military expenditure and and promote a race between global and regional stagnation of non-proliferation mechanisms. The powers towards more advanced weaponry.54 diffusion of economic, technological and, therefore, military power to multiple countries and actors is The private sector is set to increasingly drive the driving the latest iteration of a global arms race. development of military technologies, yielding Unlike previous power dynamics that were shaped advancements in semiconductor manufacturing, by weapons of deterrence, the next decade could AI, quantum computing, biotechnology and even 55 be de昀椀ned by devastation from precision attacks and nuclear fusion, among other technologies. Many expanded con昀氀icts. of these are general purpose in nature with civilian applications, but are also a force multiplier of military power, enhancing the capabilities of autonomous New military architects and weapons, cyberwarfare and defensive capabilities. architecture Emerging technologies will be increasingly subject to state-imposed limits to cross-border 昀氀ows of talent, IP, data and underlying technologies (such The 2010s saw global military expenditure growing as extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment) and in line with GDP and government budgets (5% of resources (such as critical metals and minerals), 51 expenditure, down from 12% in the early 1990s). to constrain the comparative rise of foreign rivals. However, today, global military expenditure as Enhanced focus and investment will drive innovations proportion of GDP is rising, driven predominantly by – global research and development expenditure 56 higher spending by the United States of America, hit 2.63% in 2021, the highest in decades. There the Islamic Republic of Iran, Russia, India, China are sure to be multiple architects (Figure 2.7), with and Saudi Arabia. Japan announced a proposal to parallel innovations and interoperable ecosystems double its defence budget to $105 billion (2% of that will not only undermine ef昀椀ciencies and its GDP) in May last year, and Qatar has increased duplicate efforts – even prior to the tightening of spending by 434% since 2010 in response to market conditions, technological fragmentation was 52 blockades. The war in Ukraine – as well as estimated to result in losses of up to 5% GDP for lukewarm condemnation by a few key geopolitical many economies57 – but may also increase risk. players – has driven recent pledges by NATO members to meet or exceed the target of 2% of Military-driven innovations in relevant 昀椀elds will Global Risks Report 2023 39