The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a stark This contestation is playing out across domains example of the weaknesses in international co- from information and the media to trade and ordination on health crises and the mismatch technological innovations. between existing institutions, funding levels, and future health challenges. Within states and ADAPTATION societies, there is likely to be a persistent and Finally, adaptation will be both an growing gap between what people demand imperative and a key source of advantage for and what governments and corporations can all actors in this world. Climate change, for ex- deliver. From Beirut to Bogota to Brussels, ample, will force almost all states and societies people are increasingly taking to the streets to adapt to a warmer planet. Some measures to express their dissatisfaction with govern- are as inexpensive and simple as restoring ments’ ability to meet a wide range of needs, mangrove forests or increasing rainwater stor- agendas, and expectations. As a result of these age; others are as complex as building massive disequilibriums, old orders—from institutions sea walls and planning for the relocation of to norms to types of governance—are strained large populations. Demographic shifts will and in some cases, eroding. And actors at ev- also require widespread adaption. Countries ery level are struggling to agree on new models with highly aged populations like China, Japan, for how to structure civilization. and South Korea, as well as Europe, will face constraints on economic growth in the absence CONTESTATION of adaptive strategies, such as automation and A key consequence of greater imbal- increased immigration. Technology will be a ance is greater contestation within communi- key avenue for gaining advantages through ad- ties, states, and the international community. aptation. For example, countries that are able This encompasses rising tensions, division, to harness productivity boosts from arti昀椀cial and competition in societies, states, and at the intelligence (AI) will have expanded economic international level. Many societies are increas- opportunities that could allow governments ingly divided among identity a昀케liations and at to deliver more services, reduce national debt, risk of greater fracturing. Relationships be- 昀椀nance some of the costs of an aging popula- tween societies and governments will be under tion, and help some emerging countries avoid persistent strain as states struggle to meet the middle-income trap. The bene昀椀ts from rising demands from populations. As a result, technology like AI will be unevenly distributed politics within states are likely to grow more within and between states, and more broadly, volatile and contentious, and no region, ide- adaptation is likely to reveal and exacerbate ology, or governance system seems immune inequalities. The most e昀昀ective states are likely or to have the answers. At the international to be those that can build societal consensus level, the geopolitical environment will be more and trust toward collective action on adapta- competitive—shaped by China’s challenge to tion and harness the relative expertise, capa- the United States and Western-led interna- bilities, and relationships of nonstate actors to tional system. Major powers are jockeying to complement state capacity. establish and exploit new rules of the road. A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 3 Images / Bigstock