economic interests. Longstanding security climate change, migration, and economic alliances in Europe and Asia are facing growing crises. In many cases, these challenges exceed strains from a con昀氀uence of domestic per- the institutions’ original mandates. Mem- ceptions of security threats, concerns about bers’ rising 昀椀scal challenges could translate partner reliability, and economic coercion. into diminished contributions, and sclerotic That said, if China and Russia continue to decisionmaking structures and entrenched ratchet up pressure, their actions may re-solid- interests will limit the ability to reform and ify or spawn new security relationships among adapt institutions. These institutions probably democratic and like-minded allies, enabling will work with and in some cases in parallel them to put aside di昀昀erences. with regional initiatives and other governance China and Russia probably will continue to arrangements, such as the epidemic response shun formal alliances with each other and in Sub-Saharan Africa, infrastructure 昀椀nanc- most other countries in favor of transac- ing in Asia, and arti昀椀cial intelligence (AI) and tional relationships that allow them to exert biotechnology governance. The future focus and e昀昀ectiveness of established international in昀氀uence and selectively employ economic organizations depend on the political will of and military coercion while avoiding mutual members to reform and resource the institu- security entanglements. China and Russia are tions and on the extent to which established likely to remain strongly aligned as long as Xi powers accommodate rising powers, particu- and Putin remain in power, but disagreements larly China and India. The WTO probably will over the Arctic and parts of Central Asia may face considerable uncertainty about its future increase friction as power disparities widen in role and capacity to foster greater coopera- coming years. tion and open trade as states become more Contestation Weakening Institutions protectionist and rival blocs square o昀昀 against Many of the global intergovernmental orga- each other. In contrast, the unique role of the nizations that have underpinned the West- International Monetary Fund (IMF) and high ern-led international order for decades, demand for IMF conditionality and assistance including the UN, World Bank, and World in debt restructuring most likely will make it Trade Organization (WTO), are bogged down central to the international system, although by political deadlock, decreasing capacity the growth of sovereign debt outside IMF relative to worsening transnational challenges, purview will be a challenge. Similarly, mul- and increasing country preferences for ad hoc tistakeholder agreements and organizations coalitions and regional organizations. Most of that regulate the global 昀椀nancial, insurance, or these organizations are likely to remain diplo- technical systems such as the Basel Accords matic battlegrounds and to become hollowed and Internet Engineering Task Force are likely out or sidelined by rival powers. to remain in high demand. Looking forward, these global institutions are Western leadership of the intergovernmental likely to continue to lack the capacity, mem- organizations may further decline as China ber buy-in, and resources to help e昀昀ectively and Russia obstruct Western-led initiatives manage transnational challenges, including and press their own goals. China is working to A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 99