re-mold existing international institutions to how and which technologies enter the market, re昀氀ect its development and digital governance and thereby, which technology producers gain goals and mitigate criticism on human rights advantage. Long dominated by the United and infrastructure lending while simultane- States and its allies, China is now moving ously building its own alternative arrange- aggressively to play a bigger role in establish- ments to push development, infrastructure ing standards on technologies that are likely 昀椀nance, and regional integration, including to de昀椀ne the next decade and beyond. For the Belt and Road Initiative, New Development example, international standard-setting bod- Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ies will play critical roles in determining future and the Regional Comprehensive Economic ethical standards in biotechnology research Partnership. In the past 昀椀ve years, Moscow and applications, the interface standards for has tried to undermine international e昀昀orts to global communication, and the standards for strengthen safeguards and monitor for chem- intellectual property control. ical weapons and has used the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to Competition Over Global Norms pursue opponents. A broad set of actors will increasingly compete to promote and shape widely shared global Continued underperformance of many of the norms ranging from respect for human rights global multilateral institutions is likely to shift and democratic institutions to conduct in war- some focus to alternative informal, multi-ac- fare. Some democracies that experienced pop- tor arrangements, such as the G5 Sahel Joint ulist backlashes have backed away from their Force to counter extremists in the Sahel, the longstanding roles as champions of norms global vaccine alliance, and the global initiative protecting civil liberties and individual rights. to bring greater transparency to extractive At the same time, authoritarian powers, led by industries. Some of these show promise in China and Russia, have gained traction as they 昀椀lling crucial capacity gaps, but their long-term continue to emphasize their values and push impact will depend on marshalling the re- back on norms they view as Western-centric— sources, political buy-in, and leadership from particularly those that gained currency after major and regional powers. Some regions, the end of the Cold War, such as exceptions particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and that allow for interfering in the internal a昀昀airs Southeast Asia, are likely to continue moves of member states to defend human rights. to strengthen regional organizations and During the next 20 years, this competition integration, whereas other regions are likely probably will make it harder to maintain com- to struggle to cooperate because of lingering mitment to many established norms and to inter-state divisions. develop new ones to govern behavior in new Standards as a Battlespace domains, including cyber, space, sea beds, International standards agreements sup- and the Arctic. Existing institutions and norms port the emergence of new technologies by are not well designed for evolving areas such reducing market uncertainty and establish- as biotechnology, cyber, and environmental ing norms. Membership on standard-setting response and for the growing number of new bodies is increasingly competitive, largely actors operating in space. Many norm-setting because of the in昀氀uence these bodies have on e昀昀orts may shift from consensus-based, uni- 100 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040