CONTESTED AND TRANSFORMING Although the evolving geopolitical competi- INTERNATIONAL ORDER tion is unlikely to exhibit the same ideological As global power continues to shift, many of intensity as the Cold War, China’s leadership the relationships, institutions, and norms that already perceives it is engaged in a long-term have largely governed and guided behavior ideological struggle with the United States. across issues since the end of the Cold War Ideological contests most often play out in are likely to face increasing challenges. Com- international organizations, standard-setting petition in these areas has been on the rise for forums, regional development initiatives, and years with China, Russia, and other countries public diplomacy narratives. demanding a greater say. Disagreements are Western democratic governments probably likely to intensify over the mission and conduct will contend with more assertive challenges to of these institutions and alliances, raising un- the Western-led political order from China and certainty about how well-equipped they will be Russia. Neither has felt secure in an interna- to respond to traditional and emerging issues. tional order designed for and dominated by Over time, states may even abandon some democratic powers, and they have promoted aspects of this international order. a sovereignty-based international order that Rising and revisionist powers, led by China and protects their absolute authority within their Russia, are seeking to reshape the internation- borders and geographic areas of in昀氀uence. China and Russia view the ideas and ideology al order to be more re昀氀ective of their interests space as opportunities to shape the compe- and tolerant of their governing systems. China tition without the need to use military force. and Russia continue to advocate for an order Russia aims to engender cynicism among devoid of Western-origin norms that allows foreign audiences, diminish trust in institu- them to act with impunity at home and in tions, promote conspiracy theories, and drive their perceived spheres of in昀氀uence. They are wedges in societies. As countries and nonstate advocating for alternative visions of the role of actors jockey for ideological and narrative su- the state and human rights and are seeking to premacy, control over digital communications roll back Western in昀氀uence, but their alter- platforms and other vehicles for dissemination native models di昀昀er signi昀椀cantly from each of information will become more critical. other. Russia is promoting traditional values and desires a Russian-dominated protectorate Relationships Facing More Tradeo昀昀s covering much of Eurasia. China seeks growing In this more competitive geopolitical environ- global acceptance of its current social sys- ment, many countries would prefer to main- tem—namely the Chinese Communist Party’s tain diverse relationships, particularly econom- monopoly on power and control over society— ic ties, but over time, actions by China, Russia, socialist market economy, and preferential and others may present starker choices over trading system. political, economic, and security priorities and relationships. Some countries may gravitate Increasing Ideological Competition toward looser, more ad hoc arrangements and The multidimensional rivalry with its contrast- ing governing systems has the potential to add partnerships that provide greater 昀氀exibility ideological dimensions to the power struggle. to balance security concerns with trade and 98 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040