versal membership institutions to non-global states to establish supremacy at each level of formats, including smaller and regionally-led the escalation ladder. initiatives. Alternatively, new norms might Better sensors, automation, AI, hypersonic gain momentum if states collectively perceive capabilities, and other advanced technologies growing risks of unilateral action or if increas- will produce weapons with greater accuracy, ingly powerful nonstate actors throw their speed, range, and destructive power, changing weight behind new guidelines, particularly regarding the use of emerging technologies. the character of con昀氀ict during the next 20 years. Although advanced militaries will have INCREASING RISK OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT greater access to these advanced capabilities, In this more competitive global environment, some weapons are likely to come within reach of smaller states and nonstate actors. The the risk of interstate con昀氀ict is likely to rise because of advances in technology and an ex- proliferation and di昀昀usion of these systems panding range of targets, a greater variety of over time are likely to make more civilian and military systems vulnerable, heighten the risk actors, more di昀케cult dynamics of deterrence, of escalation, potentially weaken deterrence, and weakening or gaps in treaties and norms and make combat potentially more deadly, on acceptable use. Major power militaries are although not necessarily more decisive. In a likely to seek to avoid high-intensity con昀氀ict and particularly full-scale war because of the prolonged, large-scale con昀氀ict between major prohibitive cost in resources and lives, but powers, some advanced military technologies may begin to have a diminishing impact on the the risk of such con昀氀icts breaking out through miscalculation or unwillingness to compro- battle昀椀eld as expensive and di昀케cult to quickly mise on core issues is likely to increase. replace high-end systems are damaged or de- stroyed or, in the case of munitions, expended Changing Character of Con昀氀ict in combat. Advanced sensors and weapons Rapidly advancing technologies, including will aid in counterinsurgency e昀昀orts to identify hypersonics and AI, are creating new or and target insurgent forces, but these sys- enhanced types of weapons systems while of- tems may not be su昀케cient to achieve decisive fering a wider array of potential targets, across results given the already asymmetric nature of military and civilian capabilities and including such con昀氀icts. domestic infrastructure, 昀椀nancial systems, cyber, and computer networks. These technol- Dominance in major power competition ogies will give states a broader spectrum of and more speci昀椀cally on the battle昀椀eld may coercive tools that fall below the level of kinet- increasingly depend on harnessing and pro- ic attacks, which many states may be likely to tecting information and connecting military forces. Belligerents are increasingly likely to favor as a means of achieving strategic e昀昀ects target their adversaries’ computer networks, while avoiding the political, economic, and critical infrastructure, electromagnetic spec- human costs of direct violence and declaring hostilities. The result may be further muddied trum, 昀椀nancial systems, and assets in space, distinctions between sharpened competition threatening communications and undermining warning functions. The number and quality of and con昀氀ict, increasing the motivations for sensors for observation will increase, as will 102 GLOBAL TRENDS 2040